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This is a leadership study understood through board governance in nonprofit 
organizations. The study sought to discover if there were indicators of coercive 
institutional isomorphism occurring in human service nonprofit organizations in the 
United States. IRS 990 tax forms were compiled from 2008- 2012 to determine if there 
were increasing levels of reported governance practices. Methodology included factor 
analysis, comparison of means, trend analysis, and regression models. Results indicated 
that there is an overall trend of increasing reported practices of governance in human 
service nonprofit organizations. Board size is the most significant indicator associated 
with changes in reported governance practices. Additionally, there is some support for 
age and total net assets as isomorphic institutional indicators of change. Discussion and 
conclusion remarks delve further into reasoning and unpacking of reported governance 
trends over time with emphasis placed on the leadership implications. 
Keywords: nonprofit governance, institutional isomorphism, coercive isomorphism, 





 The nonprofit sector in America has expanded and grown in form, function, and 
orientation. Literature on America’s nonprofit sector has exploded in recent years. 
Nonprofit organizations play a significant role in the American economy and the social 
structure of daily life. The birth of the nonprofit sector came from the need for diversity 
and variance in preferences as well as distrust, un-faithfulness, and lack of resources from 
the public (government) and private (business) sectors. Differences between the sectors 
(public, private, nonprofit) are at times, significant. And, at other junctures, they are 
blurred and intertwined. Nonprofit organizations are mission driven and value based 
verses for-profit ventures that are power and profit driven. Academic and practitioner 
based nonprofit research has mushroomed and best practices and comparative processes 
are plentiful in scholarly publications. The nonprofit field has swelled due to the growing 
heterogeneous population with diverse needs and interests, in addition to skepticism and 
failures of government, political systems, and social ideologies (Smith, 1991). Doctoral 
dissertations and scholarly organizations have assisted in the expansion of know-how and 
knowledge within the field, while delving deeper into questions about the nonprofit 
sector. These include: How to define nonprofit? What makes it distinct? Is there historical 
evidence for the existence and presence of the nonprofit sector? All of these questions 
have multiple purposes but one factor in common; they seek to understand the nonprofit 
sector from a leadership perspective. Nonprofit leadership is not a new or even a newly 






 Through quantitative research, the focus of my dissertation, on nonprofit 
leadership, endeavors to understand leadership through reported governance policies, 
practices, and procedures. Specifically, the purpose of this dissertation is to research, 
uncover, and discuss any possible changes of reported governance policies, practices, and 
procedures in the nonprofit sector as a possible result of coercive isomorphic changes 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Supported by the foundational theory of institutionalism, I 
aim to discover if coercive isomorphism is changing governance practices in human 
service nonprofit organizations. My study hypothesizes that there will be increases in 
reported governance practices over time and less changes in reported governance 
practices in large or older organizations. In order to test and understand my research 
question, I am structuring my dissertation as follows: 1) first a section focused on the 
nonprofit sector, including what defines the sector and what challenges it faces today, this 
sets the stage for a focus on governance in nonprofit organizations; 2) then a discussion 
on current literature and theory focused on nonprofit governance is presented; 3) 
followed by a focus on institutionalism and institutional isomorphism with an emphasis 
on coercive isomorphism.  
My research design follows a multi-phase sequential quantitative approach (Table 
1) that seeks to uncover statistical evidence regarding coercive isomorphic changes 
happening over time in human service nonprofit organizations in the United States. The 
research design consists of three distinct phases: phase one involves data mining and data 
collection, phase two presents an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and phase three 
offers methodology which is directly tied to both parts of the hypothesis, resulting in 





Following the method section are results which indicate support of the hypothesis that 
organizations are reporting increased practices of governance policies, practices, and 
procedures over time. Results also support that larger and older organizations report more 
consistent governance practices. These larger and older organizations also exhibit fewer 
changes to their governance policies and practices over time. Finally, a conclusion 
discusses the results and explains an inability to account for all aspects of governance, 
while also discussing the study’s limitations, implications, and generalizability. Also 
offered in the conclusion, are future research ideas for furthering this line of inquiry as 
well as supporting the need for more publically available nonprofit data. It is my hope as 
a nonprofit researcher to be able to translate evidence supported research into practical 
guides or best practice options for the daily practitioner. My dissertation, focused on 
nonprofit leadership understood through reported governance is my first step to fulfill this 
endeavor.     
Table 1 
Multi-phase sequential quantitative research design 
Phases 
1 Data Mining IRS 990 Tax forms 
2 Factor Analysis Extracted Components 
3 Trend graphing 
T-test 
Regression Model 
Hypotheses: H1a & H1b 
 
Defining the Nonprofit Sector 
 The nonprofit sector is comprised of social benefit organizations that are not 
government oriented or profit driven (IRS). Other names that are often used are third 
sector, not-for-profit, independent, or voluntary sector (Powell & Steinberg, 2006). 





organizations different can often be understood through characteristics and traits. 
Leadership within an organization is the pivotal component to ensuring that the 
organization is following legal mandates, as well as organizational vision, mission, and 
purpose. 
Offering a concise definition for the nonprofit sector is difficult and potentially 
misleading. The definition offered here presents the essence of the nonprofit sector in 
America, understood through a positive notion of what the sector can do and how it is 
situated; rather than the normal route of defining, that focuses on limitations, lack of 
abilities, and offering negative connotations. For the purpose of this study, the definitions 
laid out will allow the reader to garner the spirit of the nonprofit sector through a focus 
on positive characteristics and values.  
The nonprofit sector is a product of the history of the United States of America 
(Gies, 1990). The emergence of the colonial era helped develop the rise of the nonprofit 
sector. The need for the growth in the social fabric of America was due to the sheer desire 
for survival that could only be gained through trust and reciprocity with your neighbor. 
The rise of associations and associational life originated in the colonial era in order to 
offer mutual assistance and increase the distribution of resources between neighbors (Ott 
& Dicke, 2012). Immediately following the American colonial era, writer and traveler 
Alexis de Tocqueville adventured to America from France to discover and qualitatively 
analyze America’s 19
th
 century society. Tocqueville observed that the social fabric of 
America was based on associational life, enabling the banding together of citizens with 
similar issues, passions, and problems. The nonprofit sector is defined by Tocqueville as 





understand that the nonprofit sector as a product of history, we can use these definitions, 
parameters of distinction, and differential qualities to delineate the social benefit 
organizations from government and for-profit businesses. 
  Developing a definition of the nonprofit sector is a long and arduous process. 
Thanks to several researchers (Smith, 1991, 1994; Smith, Stebbins, & Dover, 2006), the 
nonprofit sector has been defined through what constitutes a nonprofit organization 
including its legalities, functional purpose, and operational structure. Though the 
following criteria is not exhaustive, it offers characteristics that lead to aid the legally 
constituted, nongovernmental entities that are incorporated under state law as social 
benefit corporations. All nonprofit organizations require the following qualities (Salamon 
& Anheier, 1997):  
 Public service mission 
 Organized as a nonprofit/charitable organization 
 Cannot have self-interest or private financial gains 
 Exempt from paying federal tax 
 Offer tax-exempt donations/ gifts 
Major categories of nonprofit organizations are defined through the National Taxonomy 
of Exempt Entities (NTEE) system, which is used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
the Foundation Center, and the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The 
NCCS is the national clearinghouse for data on nonprofit organizations in the United 
States. The NTEE system was developed in the 1980s in order to offer a way to  
“facilitate collection, tabulation, presentation, and analysis of data… promote 





provide better quality information as the basis for public policy debate and 
decision-making for the nonprofit sector and for society at large” (Sumariwalla, 
1986).   
The NTEE codes include 26 major group classifications that are organized into 10 
categories: 
I. Arts, Culture, and Humanities 
II. Education 
III. Environment and Animals 
IV. Health 
V. Human Services 
VI. International, Foreign Affairs 
VII. Public, Societal Benefit 
VIII. Religion Related 
IX. Mutual/ Membership Benefit 
X. Unknown, Unclassified 
NTEE codes are essential to nonprofit research as they offer a numeric, alphabetic, and in 
most circumstances a digital footprint to verify data. For the purpose of this study, NTEE 
codes will play a major part in understanding and upholding uniformity to the study 
results. 
 All of these varied organizations make up America’s nonprofit sector. Though the 
idea and definition of the nonprofit sector may be vague and opaque, the role of the 






The Nonprofit Sector Today 
 The term nonprofit organization tends to bring images of small struggling co-ops 
to mind, however the nonprofit sector today is as much a part of the national economy as 
the department store where you buy your suit or the grocery store where you buy coffee. 
Assets from America’s nonprofit organizations total over $4 trillion (IRS, 2013). It is 
through strong and informed leadership that the nonprofit sector has grown to become 
such an integral part of the national economy.  
 There are approximately 1.44 million nonprofit organizations registered with the 
IRS (2013), which is an increase of over 8 percent from 2002 (The Nonprofit Sector in 
Brief, 2014). Over 5.4 percent of the US gross domestic product (GDP) is from 501c3 
organizations resulting in the sector’s contribution of over $880 billion (The Nonprofit 
Sector in Brief, 2014). Included in the 1.44 million nonprofits is a diverse group of 
organizations, both in mission and size. Public charities account for over 75 percent of 
the sector’s revenues, expenses, and assets (NCCS, 2012). In 2013, total private giving 
reached over $335 billion, signaling an increase of over 4 percent from 2002 (The 
Nonprofit Sector in Brief, 2014). However, according to Giving USA, philanthropic 
giving is lower than its peak in 2007, prior to the recession. In 2013, 25 percent of adults 
volunteered, which led to the contribution of 8.1 volunteer hours per person in 2013, this 
is also down from pre-recession time (The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, 2014).  
In order to classify as a nonprofit, an organization must comply with the 
previously stated characteristics, as well as state regulations. The IRS is the governing 
body who imposes regulations on 501c3 organizations. In 2011, over 200,000 nonprofits 





Institute, 2012). Of those 200,000 organizations, 50 percent were human service or public 
benefit organizations (NTEE major code V & VII). Along with the classification of the 
nonprofit sector, there are environmental influences such as political and legal issues.     
Sarbanes-Oxley 
 Nonprofit organizations, as mentioned previously offer concrete and recognizable 
services in society. The nonprofit sector was born out of the growth of a heterogeneous 
society, the need for diverse interest, and as a reaction to government and for-profit 
market shortcomings (Powell & Steinberg, 2006). This means, to a simplistic extent, that 
nonprofits have grown to become a part of the nation’s economy and by extension, have 
been impacted by the political, economic, and social decisions of the government and 
private sectors. Nonprofit organizations and specifically their governance practices and 
policies are influenced by legislation that occurs at the national level. It is the board of 
directors’ and the leadership’s responsibility to determine the applicability of and ensure 
the compliance with legal matters in nonprofit organizations. 
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation came into force and introduced 
substantial changes to the regulation of financial practices and corporate governance in 
for-profit organizations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is mandatory for all legally 
registered, publically traded for-profit businesses. The Act is named after Senator Paul 
Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley who conceived the structure and deadlines 
associated with the legislation (SEC, 2002). The Act is constructed into 11 titles, in 
regards to compliance; the sections that are most relevant to nonprofit organizations are 
302, 401, 404, 409, 802, and 906 (SEC, 2002). President Bush signed the Act into law 





American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt” (SEC, 2002). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act aims to rebuild public trust in the private sector, which came 
about as a response to corporate scandals regarding accounting. It is a requirement for 
publically traded companies to conform to the new standards of financial and auditing 
procedures
i
. The US law passed in 2002 aims to strengthen corporate governance and 
restore consumer confidence. The Sarbanes-Oxley act directly affects publically traded 
companies and places regulations on what companies must do to ensure auditors’ 
independence. Furthermore, the Act dictates the process for electing competent audit 
committee members and ensuring adequate reporting procedures. The Act also closes 
most of the loopholes relating to document destruction and whistler-blower protection. 
This applies to both for-profit and nonprofit entities. As previously stated, there are 11 
titles to Public Law 107-204, 107
th
 Congress, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
I. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
II. Auditor Independence 
III. Corporate Responsibility 
IV. Enhanced Financial Disclosures 
V. Analyst Conflicts of Interest 
VI. Commission Resources and Authority 
VII. Studies and Reports 
VIII. Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability 
IX. White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements 
X. Corporate Tax Returns 





The Act addresses insider transactions and conflicts of interest, independent and 
competent audit committees, responsibilities of auditors, certification of financial 
statements, disclosures, whistle-blower protection, and document destruction (SEC, 
2002). Additionally, within the written law, there are definitional parameters that set the 
stage for understanding the who, what, when, and why of the specific regulations and 
appropriate applications. The law focuses on American publically traded corporations; 
however, two specific compliances apply to nonprofit organizations: document 
destruction and whistle-blower protection (SEC, 2002). Additionally, organizations such 
as Board Source and the Independent Sector assert that there are several aspects of the 
law that can and should apply to the nonprofit sector (Board Source, 2003; 2006). In their 
joint publication The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit Organizations, 
2003/2006, Board Source and the Independent Sector offer recommendations that 
nonprofits voluntarily incorporate provisions of the act that make good governance sense.  
Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley for the Nonprofit Organization 
 Implications for nonprofits derived from the 2002 Act include recommendations 
on promoting effective oversight that include having a conflict of interest statement, 
ensuring there is an audit committee, certifying financial statements, procedures for 
destruction of documents, policies for whistle-blower protection, and having written 
disclosures for committee members-specifically the audit committee. It is the board of 
directors and the leadership’s responsibility to determine the applicability of and ensure 
the compliance of legal matters within nonprofit organizations. The following is a review 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, how the provisions affect nonprofit leadership, and 





Independent and competent audit committee. The Act requires that there be 
audit committees and that each member of the audit committee be a member of the board. 
They also must be independent, defined as not being part of the management team and 
not receiving compensation. This provision also states that there needs to be a disclosure 
of at least one “financial expert” that serves on the audit committee. However, a 
definition for financial expert is not specified. This section also outlines that the audit 
committee is responsible for hiring, setting compensation, and overseeing the auditor’s 
activities. Furthermore, the audit committee should explicitly set rules, procedures, and 
practices. The relevance to nonprofit boards includes the recommendation that they 
establish audit committees. These could be formed through financial committees. It also 
lays out the good practice of establishing independent audits and complete review of 
auditing practices.  
Many states have taken it upon themselves to regulate nonprofit auditing practices 
through the attorney general’s office. For example in California, the state legislation 
passed the Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, which stipulates that nonprofit organizations 
whose revenues exceed $2 million must have an independent auditor (California's 
Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004). However, not all nonprofits are required to undertake a 
full audit and place the responsibility on their board of directors. Several nonprofits have 
outside requirements for completing audits. Nonprofit organizations that receive over 
$500,000 from federal funds are automatically required to complete audits as laid out by 
their grant contract (Board Source, 2003). It is highly recommended that the governance 
boards take the time to determine the cost-benefit of conducting audits, both internal and 





Independent Sector strongly recommend that all nonprofit boards take the necessary steps 
to complete an annual fiscal financial review. Even though most nonprofit board 
members are volunteers, financial literacy should be included in board orientation (Board 
Source, 2003). This section of the act also lends nicely to the suggestion that auditing 
companies should consider offering pro-bono audits for social benefit organizations 
(Independent Sector, 2009:2010).    
Responsibilities of auditors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits that auditing 
companies from offering other financial services to the same organization. For example, 
one company cannot be responsible for the bookkeeping, computer information systems, 
appraisal services, human resources, etc. Additionally, the same individual or company 
performing the audit must rotate every five years. Implications for nonprofit 
organizations include changing auditors as laid out in the Act (SEC, 2002). It would also 
be beneficial for nonprofit organizations to use different partners or firms for other 
management responsibilities as well (bookkeeping, appraisal, etc.) (Board Source, 2003). 
This section of the act also discusses relevant disclosures for internal controls and 
practices (SEC, 2002). Again, Board Source and The Independent Sector (2003) suggest 
that it would be beneficial to nonprofit organizations to include written disclosures in 
their policies, which would thereby increase transparency.  
Certified financial statements. Sarbanes-Oxley set forth the provisions that the 
chief executive and chief financial officer must certify financial statements. This includes 
certifying for appropriateness, operations, and fairness. Criminal sanctions are associated 
with false certifications. Executive directors, board presidents, and the head of the 





increases transparency as well as integrity within the nonprofit organization. A key 
financial document for 501c3 organizations is the IRS 990 tax form (Appendix A). The 
form requires a signature from leadership within the organization. Unfortunately, 
research from a number of studies reveals that the accuracy of IRS 990 tax forms is low 
and unreliable (Board Source, 2003). Many of these errors are directly related to failure 
to complete the form, misinterpretation, or a lack of understanding of the form, as well as 
the inaccurate reporting of fundraising costs and other financial expenditures (Jackson, 
2007; Behn, DeVries, & Lin, 2007). These reporting errors support the provision laid out 
that nonprofit leadership needs to examine and reexamine their financial statements for 
accuracy, reliability, and completeness, which in turn should be appropriately recorded 
and reported on the IRS 990 tax form.  
Insider transactions and conflicts of interest. Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits loans to 
company leadership and management. The nonprofit sector is already highly regulated 
concerning monetary functions and transactions. State laws set forth that 501c3 
organizations “cannot have self-interest or private financial gains” (Salamon & Anheier, 
1997). Penalties are associated with private inurement and excessive personal benefit. 
Therefore, providing loans to company leadership and management is not a specific issue 
or concern of nonprofit organizations; however, it is recommended to continue the 
practice of not lending monies to staff or board members.    
Disclosures. Multiple disclosures are required for compliance to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. These include information on internal controls, correction of past financial 
statements, material off balance sheet transactions, material changes in operations, and 





not publically traded. It is important that nonprofits provide this information on the IRS 
990 tax form for their funders, donors, clients, media, and the general public. It is 
required that 501c3 organizations make their IRS 990 tax form publically available and 
free to anyone who requests them, either in writing or in person (IRS, 2008). This also 
leads to the recommendation that nonprofit organizations should file their IRS 990 tax 
form yearly and electronically. This increases nonprofit transparency and accountability 
to the public.   
Whistle-blower protection. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act set-forth protection for 
whistle-blowers that has become an amendment to the federal criminal code. Whistle-
blowers are persons who risk their careers by reporting suspected illegal activities within 
their organization of employment (Whistleblower, 2011).The Act allows for criminal 
penalties for action taken in retaliation against whistle-blowers. Implications for the 
nonprofit sector are straightforward, since this provision applies to all organizations – 
for-profit and nonprofit. Nonprofit organizations need to start protecting themselves by 
increasing professionalization and professional practices of accounting, human resources, 
financial statements, bookkeeping, and board of directors meeting documentation. 
Written policies are highly encouraged to eliminate any unclear directives and establish a 
record of ethical and clear-cut guidelines for decision-making. Nonprofits need to adopt 
and implement clearly written policies especially concerning complaints and actions 
needed in order to prevent retaliation.  
Document destruction. The Act clearly identifies that it is a crime to falsify, 
alter, change, destroy, or re-create any document. This provision of the Act also amended 





Nonprofits should maintain accurate records of all proceedings, especially legal and those 
that lead to decisions. Board meeting minutes need documentation and approval by a 
quorum of board members. Employee/staff files, major transactions, fundraising efforts, 
real estate, and other contracts should all be filed and accessible. This includes paper 
documents, digital memos, and voicemails.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been in place since 2002, with recommendations for 
the nonprofit sector arising in 2003 and further revisions in 2006 (Board Source, 2003; 
2006). As one result of the Act, the IRS has increased the questions and included sections 
related to governance and auditing (Part VI & XII) on the IRS 990 tax form (Table 2). 
This was the first time since 1979 that the federal government revised the IRS 990 tax 
form. The government’s reasoning behind the revisions was to increase transparency, add 
accountability, and enhance governance (Bakale, 2009; Halloran & Higgins, 2008; 
Smoker & Mammano, 2009). State and federal governments do not require completion of 
the governance section of the IRS 990 tax form and only organizations with assets over 
$25,000 USD are required to file an IRS 990 tax form. However, it is a vital part of the 
available data regarding nonprofit organizations in the United States. The National Center 








IRS 990 tax form nonprofit governance measures  
Variable Description Variable Location 
on IRS 990 form 
Coding 
Family/business relationships between personnel Part VI Question 2 0=yes 1=no 
Management function outsources Part VI Question 3 0=yes 1=no 
Organizational document changes Part VI Question 4 0=yes 1=no 
Material diversion of assets Part VI Question 5 0=yes 1=no 
Documentation of governing body meetings Part VI Question 8a 1=yes 0=no 
Documentation of authorized committee meetings Part VI Question 
8b 
0=yes 1=no 
Key organizations personnel unreachable Part VI Question 9 1=yes 0=no 
Governing body review of 990 form prior to filing Part VI Question 
11 
1=yes 0=no 
Written conflict of interest policy Part VI Question 
12a 
1=yes 0=no 
Key personnel in org disclose conflicts of interest Part VI Question 
12b 
1=yes 0=no 
Compliance enforcement of conflict of interest 
policy 
Part VI Question 
12c 
1=yes 0=no 
Written whistle-blower policy Part VI Question 
13 
1=yes 0=no 
Written document retention and destruction policy Part VI Question 
14 
1=yes 0=no 
CEO or top executives’ compensation approved Part VI Question 
15a 
1=yes 0=no 
Key personnel compensation approved Part VI Question 
15b 
1=yes 0=no 
Applicable forms disclosed on organizations’ own 
website 
Part VI Question 
18 
1=yes 0=no 
Contact information for organization provided in 
governance section 
Part VI Question 
20 
1=yes 0=no 
Accounting method Part XII Question 1 1=accrual 
0=other 
Organization’s financial statement compiled or 
reviewed by independent accountant 
Part XII Question 
2a 
1=yes 0=no 
Organization’s financial statement compiled or 
reviewed by independent accountant 
Part XII Question 
2b 
1=yes 0=no 
Organization has an audit committee Part XII Question 
2c 
1=yes 0=no 








Problem and Research Statement 
Even though Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 2002 and the IRS implemented 
higher levels of questioning on the IRS 990 tax form in 2008, all with the purpose of 
increasing transparency and accountability, there is little to no scholarly research focused 
on governance trends, implementation, or usage of the IRS 990 tax form, since it is 
relatively new and difficult to access. This could be associated with the fact that the new 
sections on governance and auditing have yet to be made digital through the Urban 
Institute’s NCCS database. The lack of available digital data could be a reason for the 
lack of research on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s implications, effects, and repercussion 
within the nonprofit sector. This lack of oversight and follow-through of connecting 
collected data to the researcher and therefore being able to translate research results for 
the practitioner is the basis of this study. If research cannot be simply and clearly 
conducted then how are results going to be able to be generalized and put into action to 
increase the public knowledge of nonprofit organizations? It is the purpose and goal of 
this dissertation to take steps to understand the governance data collected on the IRS 990 
tax form and statistically interpret any potential trends and helpful insights for the 
nonprofit practitioner. Being able to numerically code answers from the governance and 
auditing sections will allow for a quantitative analysis of the data. This can then be 
tracked for trends or holes in the collected governance data. It is my hope that results will 
encourage further use of IRS 990 tax form data while also advocating for more publically 
accessible data sets for the nonprofit sector.  
 There is a need for research about nonprofit governance that deals with current 





occurring within the field. In order to examine these possibilities, I have sought out 
literature and scholarly research regarding the nonprofit sector, specifically research and 
publications focusing on the practitioners and quantitative methodological approaches. 
The nonprofit sector today has suffered from the 2008 global financial crisis and the 
housing bubble burst. Pressures, influences, and consequential reactions from 
sociopolitical changes, both good and bad and extreme and not extreme, all have some 
level of effect on the nonprofit field. Additionally, the growing importance of the 
nonprofit sector has also led to further scrutiny by the public. Issues of accountability and 
performance have been raised. However, in order to answer these inquiries, there needs to 
be current data collected and then made available to the researcher. This study aims to 
take a step in that direction, by using the previously stated governance and auditing data 
from the IRS 990 tax form to determine: first relatedness to governance practices and 
then potential changes occurring over time. Following this line of inquiry and based on 
the environmental context and whole economy changes that are occurring I have 
formulated the research question to an overarching inquiry:  
Is coercive isomorphism changing reported governance practices in human 
service nonprofit organizations?  
In order to offer further explanation and justification for this research directive, I define 
and discuss relevant research including models and theory. I begin with an umbrella 
approach, first discussing organizational change leadership, then moving on to nonprofit 
governance, and narrowing the scope down to institutionalism. This is then followed by a 
discussion of new institutionalism innovations and culminating with coercive isomorphic 






Literature and Theory 
 The increased attention on nonprofit organization post Sarbanes-Oxley led to an 
upsurge in research literature. In nonprofit organizations, the governing body is the board 
of directors. The board is the leadership of the organization and has oversight 
responsibilities that include legal, ethical, and fiduciary components. 
Organizational Change Leadership  
 Organizational theory is a foundation and research platform of the social sciences. 
Organizational change, a category of organizational theory, has multi-disciplinary roots. 
Organizational change targets multiple different activities, dimensions, and levels of 
analysis. Activities include reporting changes in relationships and in funding for 
organizations. Different dimensions include areas related to planning, the magnitude of 
the change, and the continuity of the change process. Additionally, organizational 
changes have different levels of analysis ranging from the organizational level (the one 
examined in this study), to the group, to the individual, as well as a macro function 
focusing on the entire system as a unit of analysis. Models of change that are often 
researched in organizational change include Lewin’s force field model (1951), 
Weisbrod’s six box model (1976), Nadler and Tuchman’s congruence model (1983), and 
Burke-Litwin’s model of organizational performance and change (1992, 2009). Each of 
the preceding models have specific purposes ranging from managing problems, objective 
setting, and goodness of fit regarding organizational objectives. In organizational change 
theory, organizations are not objects or things, rather they are living, breathing, and 





actions, dialogue, vision, and passion. Organizations are not only influential to those 
within the organization, but play an active role in civil society. When focusing on 
nonprofit organizations, these operations not only fulfill a need of a good or service to the 
public but are also guided by the needs and wishes of their constituents. Organizations 
are socially constructed as mechanisms for change.    
Organizational change has three different approaches: selection, adaption, and 
embeddedness (Galazkiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998). Selection models include looking at the 
environment for potential reasons or sources of change and include organizational 
ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and some aspects of institutional theory (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). Adaptation models look at the attributes that make it possible to achieve 
outcomes and include theoretical designs such as resource dependency (Pfeffer & 
Salanick, 1978), contingency theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Fiedler, 1972), part of 
the foundation of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and economic based 
transaction theory (Williamson, 1975). The third model of organizational change is 
embeddedness from sociology literature and it strives to place change within different 
social structures. Grannovetter (1985) empirically studied and conceptualized 
embeddedness theory, whereby there are strong and weak ties in society that dictate how 
decisions are made and how resources are attained, thus developing the embedded 
approach.  
 Organizational change includes multi-faceted definitions and conforms to allow 
for various definitional parameters (Powell & Bromley, 2013). Theories related to 
organizational change are malleable and able to adjust to various situational differences 





and hypothesized for years. However, it was not until the mid-1900s that academicians 
accepted organizational change theory (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004). At times, it is simple 
to see that change has occurred, however, there are other instances that leave uncertainty 
or an unclear path to understanding these changes. The emergence of studies related to 
the ecological environment and the area where organizations live and candor thrives has 
affected organizational change literature. This allows and expands the nature of the 
research to focus on external environments rather than internal environments (Hawley, 
1950; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Warren, 1967). In 1950, Hawley concluded that an 
organizational environment was derived from an ecological community based on 
geographic location. This led to an understanding that organizations within close 
proximity to others cooperated, competed, and potentially copied each other.  
Expanding and contrasting the ecological environment is the institutional 
environment which includes culture and influences on organizational behavior. 
Institutional environment deals with defining and enforcing appropriate behaviors (Scott, 
1995). This also deals with conferring organizational legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Scott’s 
study focused on sociopolitical legitimacy (Baum & Powell, 1995; Hannan & Carroll, 
1995), whereas ecologists research legitimacy through constructive legitimacy. 
Constructive legitimacy is cognitive and process oriented. Sociopolitical legitimacy 
related to behavioral conformity is the concept of violation or punishment based on laws, 
norms, or standards. Another research avenue of legitimacy focuses on changes in laws 
or passage of legislation (Singh, Tucker, & Meinhard, 1991). This is not constructive 
legitimacy or sociopolitical, rather it is a broader understanding of institutionalism where 





regulated, or legitimate in the eyes of the public. This line of inquiry deals with 
exogenous institutional change (Hannon & Carroll, 1995).  
Within the organizational change and organizational legitimacy, the governance 
of the organization is important. The board of directors of a nonprofit organization has 
duties to follow and abide by, these include the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and duty 
of obedience. Each of these duties influence organizational legitimacy. The following 
sections discuss and apply legitimacy as understood through institutionalism in the 
context of this research study.  
Nonprofit Governance 
Organizational change leadership manifests in different way, depending on the 
situational construct. For nonprofit organizations, the board, as the governing body can 
be seen as the leadership of the organization. And governance in nonprofit organization is 
studies through board actions, decisions, and procedures. 
Governance is progressive and ever changing, as governance models are evolving 
tools of leadership. Governance theorems regarding nonprofit organizations focus on the 
board of directors or trustees. The responsibilities that are associated with these 
individuals are based on principles of leadership, oversight, and organizational structure 
(BoardSource, 2010). All of these principles have a common factor in nonprofit 
organizations, which is the mission. A nonprofit organization is mission based and 
mission driven. An organization’s mission encompasses the purpose of the organization 
and acts as a north star for the future. 
 Governance as a theory and practice is an integral part of daily organizational 





Governance theories are vast and defined while utilization has been found to be 
collaborative and to take the form of hybrid models (Gill, 2002).  
Governance theory is a traditional hierarchical arrangement. A top down 
organizational structure of governance is the traditional model, whereby the board tells 
management what they want accomplished. The failures remain that the board is often 
dilettante and ends up being a follower to management (Ballantyne & Associates, 2006). 
However, current literature on governance and roles of boards offers a wide array of 
models; there is not a one size fits all, rather many theorems that offer frameworks to 
understanding models of governance. Research has noted that several issues and 
obstacles exist in conceptualizing and measuring governance effectiveness and 
implementation (Nobbie & Brundney, 2003).   
This dissertation focuses on institutional isomorphism theory from organizational 
literature. However, a broad understanding of other nonprofit governance theories and 
conceptual foundations is imperative to understand other possible error terms, 
environmental conditions, and sectorial relations. Therefore, the following section briefly 
outlines nonprofit governance models. 
Governance models range from economic based agency theory (Fama & Jenson, 
1983) and institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) to power relationship based 
models (Murray, Bradshaw, & Wolpin, 1992; Hillard, 2008; Jager & Rehli, 2012)
ii
. 
Power, as a concept of governance, is the ability to implement one’s will against 
opposition (Jager & Rehli, 2012). Governance models based on power relationships have 
been studied from board and CEO relationships to determine the differences between 





Bradshaw, & Wolpin, 1992). A trust based model of governance involving CEO and 
board partnerships with the community and offering a stepladder approach, while framed 
in social capital theory, has also been studied (Hillard, 2008). Results offer a trust-
building framework as the first step of the model, followed by interactions between the 
board chair and the executive director allowing for the formation of a relationship that 
could offer mutual benefits. There are three different levels of benefits: managing, 
planning, and leading, each with incremental increases in building social capital. The 
third addition to the governance trust model is interpersonal interaction stemming from 
prior knowledge as a proactive component to social capital building through governance.  
 Another avenue of governance research is through roles, specifically roles of 
board chairs and executive directors. Deductive models of governance focus on 
relationships between executives and the board through qualitative analysis. Results 
indicate that relationships matter in organizational structure, behaviors, and resource 
environments (Brown & Guo, 2010). The findings in Brown & Guo’s (2010) study align 
with previous work compiled by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), which detailed resource 
dependency, and indicated that it was a driving factor in board member contributions.  
“Governance framework reflects the recognition by scholars and practitioners 
alike that solving important public problems today means considering the wider net of 
actors working on these problems” (Benjamin, 2010, pg 612). Governance in a nonprofit 
organization is adaptable and inclusive of economic, political, and social theories, while 
also supporting the notion that organizations are influenced by outside actors and 





Nonprofit governance, as researched by Cornforth, is defined as the “systems and 
processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and accountability of an 
organization” (Cornforth, 2004: 2011, pg 6). This definition is the foundation of this 
study. Understanding how to operationalize a definition is contextually important in order 
to define the parameters of the overall research endeavor. The above definition for 
nonprofit governance is operationalized through this study by means of the IRS 990 tax 
form and Part VI and XII that collect data on reported governance policies, practices and 
procedures of nonprofit organizations in the United States. To unpack and operationalize 
the above definition of nonprofit governance I specifically examine the reported systems, 
as seen through policies, the processes as seen through practices, and procedures as 
derived from self-reported information in the IRS 990 tax form.  
The need to first and foremost understand what nonprofit governance is and the 
extent to which the knowledge of policies, practices, and procedures can help the 
practitioner is underrated. This is part of the problem that my dissertation is addressing, 
specifically seeking to uncover what policies and practices of governance are being 
reported. There is a dire need and a research gap when it comes to reporting and the 
utilization of reported documents. Not only is there a lack of understanding of IRS tax 
documents, but the IRS increased the number of questions on the 990 tax form, and never 
offered detailed analysis on those forms or assistance to nonprofit organization as to how 
the form should be filled out or what benefit completing the forms produced (IRS, 2008-
2013). Nonprofit governance focusing on the “systems and processes concerned with 
ensuring the overall direction, control, and accountability of an organization” (Cornforth, 





institutional theory. Institutional theory is one of the most developed, studied, and 
understood theories of cross-disciplinary research (Cornforth & Brown, 2014). 
Institutional theory has been used to determine and further narrow my dissertation’s 
research objective. 
Institutionalism 
 In its simplest form, institutionalism is a set of rules. They form the foundation for 
behaviors within organizations. As with the above areas of research, institutionalism is 
multifaceted. Institutional theory has the ability to be conceptualized and understood as a 
broad connection between multiple disciplines, all with a shared understanding that 
defines this theoretical orientation. The link or thread that connects all the disciplinary 
views is the endeavor to discover and follow the relationships between social structures 
and organizations. However, that is the extent to which there are similarities, the 
definition of institutions differ from scholar to scholar. Institutions are conceptualized 
differently, focal features of organizations differ, and focus of research arguments are 
dissimilar (Powell & Bromley, 2013). This robust theoretical orientation lends itself 
nicely to understanding organizational leadership.  
Institutional theory is a prominent theoretical perspective found in business and 
public administration research and asserts that an organization’s environment is 
influential (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Institutional theory dictates that organizations 
seek legitimacy through their environments including internal personnel, stakeholders, 
and external constituents. Institutional theory further stipulates that in order for an 
organization to be valid, the organization will adopt and submit to the values, norms, 





(Cornforth & Brown, 2014). Organizations, as explained through institutional theory, 
adhere to the norms and values of their environment, and replicate practices of ‘good 
governance’ in order to be internally and externally viewed as a genuine organization.  
Institutional theory, as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell in 1983 and later 
defined and expanded as new institutionalism in 1991, is a mechanism for understanding 
and interpreting organizational change. Similar to organizational charts, families of 
theories can be visualized as a hierarchical ladder. Institutionalism is a subcategory of 
organizational change, which is a category under organizational theory, in the social 
sciences. Within organizational literature, institutional theory is the foundation for both 
the adaption change and selective change theoretical models (Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 
1998).  
New Institutionalism. Institutional theory is an old analysis, striving to 
understand influential social factors. However, the theoretical approach is sufficiently 
novel as to be considered contemporary and often examined as a new distinctive 
approach (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 2012). The main reasons behind the new concept is 
the lack of agreement on macro and micro features, their differences of importance of 
cognitive and normative aspects of institutions and the overall importance of networks. 
New institutionalism is therefore not necessarily a new concept, rather an approach that 
has been utilized for centuries, though has recently grown in observance in the social 
sciences (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). Active research lines have recently emerged in 
economics, political science, and sociology providing strength behind the new 
institutionalism movement in research literature. This further lends strength to the use of 





leadership in scholarly research. The main differences in the “new” verses “old” view of 
institutionalism is the focus of the research. “Old” institutionalism focused on policies 
and routines in an effort for an organization to be self-sustaining. “New” institutionalism 
focuses on the external environment and the socially constructed pressures that effect 
organizations. These external pressures create templates of how organizations should be 
and how they should be functioning, thereby leading to legitimacy among organizations. 
New institutional studies focus on isomorphism, decoupling, and distribution, including 
the later works from DiMaggio and Powell (1991). Focusing on the external 
environment, institutional isomorphism as laid out and defined by DiMaggio and Powell 
will be parsed out as the focus of the remaining review of literature.   
 Institutional isomorphism. Further defining elements of institutional theory, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983:1991) discussed three mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic, and normative (Appendix B). Coercive is defined 
through pressures from other organizations or outside entities. Within coercive 
isomorphism, there are characteristics of conformity. Mimetic means imitation-more 
specifically on the organizational level of analysis, imitation of other outside agencies. 
Normative isomorphic change refers to pressures both internal and external to the 
organization. Isomorphism, according DiMaggio and Powell in their 1983 article, is a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face 
the same set of environmental conditions. Literature suggests and research results 
indicate that, in general, organizations compete for resources, consumers, and power, all 
of which are contextual factors related to nonprofit governance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 





theory provides predictors for diagnosing isomorphic change, utilizing different 
predictors depending on the domain of analysis. At the organizational level of analysis, 
these include organizations being more dependent upon other organizations, changes in 
structure to replicate those of other firms, centralization of resources, ambiguity of goals, 
and greater reliance on professional staff in order to create a more professionalized 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional isomorphism theory posits that 
isomorphic changes in organizations enables agencies to interact with each other on the 
same level, thereby increasing each other’s legitimacy.  
For the purpose of my dissertation the analysis takes place at the organization 
level. Additionally, only coercive isomorphic change will be discussed, as I am only able 
to understand and examine the coercive factors through the available data and 
methodology. Coercive institutional isomorphism theory is used to understand and 
interpret the reported governance changes that are hypothesized in this study.  
Research question 
 Based on the environmental context and economic changes that are currently 
occurring, and given my interest in nonprofit governance, I moved from first being 
interested in issues, to focusing on and reviewing the literature. Then I sought out 
research ideas that focused on areas of strategic leadership. The changes in the IRS 990 
tax form took place starting with the 2008 tax year, therefore this study starts as a blank 
slate in 2008; I am not looking prior to 2008, thereby in order to focus on the questions 
spurred by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Because of the changes that have occurred and 
continue to ignite concern among the public, I anticipate the data will provide evidence of 





statements, auditing committees, and third party reviewers. With the guidance of coercive 
institutional isomorphism theory and the indicators laid out through the research 
literature, I have structured the following research question: 
 Is coercive isomorphism changing reported governance practices in human 
service nonprofit organizations? 
Hypotheses 
 As earlier discussed institutional isomorphism offers the challenge to researchers 
to discover changes over time, which is the purpose of my dissertation study. The first 
hypothesis indicates that I expect to see increasing practices of reported governance over 
time. However, increasing governance is in no way reflecting the notion that more 
governance is better governance, rather there are more policies, practices, and procedures 
reported through the IRS 990 tax form. These policies, practices, and procedures reported 
through questions on the IRS 990 tax form are operationalized as the governance 
practices being carried out by the organizations. My second hypothesis seeks to 
determine if there are similarities between organizations that report consistent and stable 
governance practices or the inverse. This is identified through indicators as laid out 
through institutional isomorphism theory. These include agency size and age, which 
according to institutional isomorphism theory are indicators that lead to more 
homogeneity and consistency in practices, specifically in larger and older organizations 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 1991; Powell & Bromley, 2013).   
 H1a: Human service nonprofit organizations will report increasing practices of 





 H1b: Human service nonprofit organizations that are larger and older will report 
more consistent governance practices, thereby exhibiting fewer changes to their 








My research design seeks to uncover statistical evidence regarding coercive 
isomorphic changes happening over time in human service nonprofit organizations in the 
United States. Using a multi-phase sequential quantitative approach allows me to gain as 
full of a model as possible. The research design consists of three distinct phases: phase 
one data mining and data collection, phase two an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and 
phase three statistical analysis which is directly tied to both parts of the hypotheses, 
resulting in computation and interpretation of trend analysis, t-test, multiple regression 
models, and follow up robustness tests (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Multi-phase Sequential Quantitative Research Design 
Phase Method Support 
1 Data Mining IRS 990 Tax forms 
2 Factor Analysis Extracted Components 
3 Trend graphing 
T-test 
Regression Model 
Hypotheses: H1a & H1b 
 
In their review of governance, Ostrower and Stone (2006) report that there is a 
need for new and additional types of data in order to further governance research. The 
research conducted and compiled for my dissertation is meeting this need, by mining data 
that is underutilized. Reported data from the IRS 990 tax form is publically available 
information, yet it is not being fully utilized and the benefits associated with this data are 
not yet realized. My methodology section builds on the information from the above 





institutional isomorphism theory that offers exogenous and endogenous factors 
influencing organizational legitimacy.  
Sample and Selection  
 Variables utilized in the database include EIN codes, location of operation, total 
net assets for each year (2008- 2012), year of formation, number of board members and 
Parts VI and XII from the IRS 990 tax form. The EIN code for each organization is used 
as an identifier to look up each IRS 990 tax form. The location variable is based on the 
US Census Bureau classification of United States regions: Northeast, South, West, and 
Midwest. The location of operation variables are dummy coded in order to use this 
categorical variable as a predictor variable. Total net assets are taken directly from the 
IRS 990 tax form. Because of the large asset sizes, the logarithm for the total net assets is 
utilized. The year of formation or age variable is calculated as 2012-year of formation. 
The number of board members is included as a control variable, based on nonprofit 
governance literature that supports the importance of boards in nonprofit organizations. 
As shown in Table 2, information extracted from the IRS 990 tax form includes policies, 
practices, procedures, and board size variables. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the independent variables and Table 4 includes the dependent variables. Furthermore, 
I have winsorized my data at the 90
th
 percentile (Appendix C).  
 The sample size started at 1000 human service nonprofit organizations in the 
United States. After cleaning the data there were 959 in my total sample. This was further 
reduced to 888, when it was discovered that there were several organizations that did not 
list any board members. Once again the sample was reduced for the intial regression 





policies, practices and procedures for the five year period of study. Therefore the sample 
decreased to 456. However, through the robustness testing the regression models were 
conducted on the entire sample of 888. Additionally, the 432 organizations that reported 
no changes in reported governance practices were also further investigated, through 
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In order to better understand my data I also looked at the spread of the 
independent coercive isomorphic variable of total net assets and the control variable, 
board size for each year of the study. The total net assets variable (Graph 1) shows a gain 
of total net assets from 2008 to 2011, but a decrease in 2012 is shown. This could be 
because there is an organization that in 2012 is an outlier and reports a $13,232,608 loss. 
The control variable, board size showed minimal changes over time (Graph 2). There is a 
one hundredth of a point increase between 2008 and 2011, with four hundredths of a 
point increase in 2012. The mean number of board members in 2008 is 12.76 rising to 
12.81 in 2012. However, there are several organizations that report 0 board members and 
two that report 184. This is problematic, because it is a federal requirement that nonprofit 
organizations have a board of directors. Of the 959 organizations researched, 67 
organizations showed an average board size of 0. The mean board size was computed as, 
the number of board members for ((2008+ 2009+ 2010+ 2011+ 2012)/ 5). Because the 
statistic showed that there were so many boards that ended up with an average size of 0, I 
chose to decrease my sample size to include only those boards that had on average one 
board member. Per federal law, nonprofit organizations are required to have an oversight 
board in order to operate. This measure of board size could be wrong due to input error, 
self-reporting error, or simply error in misunderstanding the question. Additionally, I 
removed the organizations (2) that reported 184 board members, as this was an extreme 
outlier. Furthermore, when reviewing the total net assets, one organization was removed, 
because I believed there to be reporting error. At year one they reported -$154,171 total 
net assets, year two they reported $4,316, and year five they reported $3,183, creating a 
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The multiphase quantitative study starts with the creation of a database including 
1000 human service public charity organizations that were randomly selected from all 
human service organizations in the NCCS core database. This study utilizes a sample of 
501c3, human service operating charities in the United States of America. As of 2012, 
there were over 60,000 organizations classified under the NTEE major code ‘HU’ or 
human service. This study’s sample size is just under 2% of the reported population. 
However, human service organizations range from crime and legal related entities to 
youth development organizations and relief centers. The NTEE code of human service 
was specifically chosen because of the range of goods and services included under the 
NTEE code. Additionally, human service organizations were chosen to bound the 
parameters of the study and initially retrieve research results from one subsector of 
nonprofit organizations, instead of obtaining a random sample from all nonprofit 
organizations.  
In order to address validity, 1000 organization were chosen to have a large 
enough sample size to account for missing variables and conduct the regression analysis 
without worry about the degree of operationalization of the data construct. Data derived 
from IRS 990 tax forms have been collected and downloaded from Guidestar. Guidestar 
is a 501c3 organization that gathers and makes publicly available information on IRS 
registered nonprofit organizations (Guidestar, 2013). The database includes the 
organization’s Employee Identification numbers (EIN), location of incorporation, age of 
the organization, total net assets, board size, and questions related to governance 





Section B Questions 11a, 12a, 12b, 12c, 13, 14, 15a, 15b, 15; Part IV Section C 
Questions 18, 20; Part XII Questions 2a, 2b, 2c (Appendix A & Table 2).  
Each IRS 990 tax form has been individually read, reviewed, and coded by the 
researcher. Coding to answers from Part VI and Part XII is in increasing practice of 
governance; for example, Part VI Question 11 asks, if the governing body reviews the 
IRS 990 tax form prior to filing, if the organization check yes, they are coded as 1. 
Answers to the questions are dichotomous, ‘yes’ or ‘no;’ coding of these measures are ‘1’ 
and ‘0.’ Coding was specifically conducted to include ‘1’ to positively identify if a 
governance policy or practice is being utilized. A ‘0’ represents that the organization does 
not utilize the governance policy or practice.  
Data Mining 
 The resulting data base includes all of the governance variables on the IRS 990 
tax form (Table 2). Each of those 21 variables are coded 0 or 1 in respect to increasing 
governance. The resulting ordinal variables were then transcribed into an excel data 
sheet. This process of coding and recording was repeated for the 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
and 2012 forms, for the 1000 human service organizations. Variables that were 
additionally extracted from the NCCS data base included total assets, location of 
incorporation, ruling date for origination of organizations, and number of board members. 
All of this information, once compiled, resulted in a multi-layer complex data set. As far 
as I know, this is the only data set that has governance information individually extracted 
and coded from the IRS 990 tax forms over multiple years. The data was cleaned by 
matching up the available data per year for each EIN number, making sure there were no 





the data was cleaned there were 959 organizations left in the data set. Specifically, the 
total number of observations decreased once EIN numbers were compared and data was 
included for each year. For example, I started with 1121 EIN numbers for 2011, which 
decreased to 1081 when matched to 2012, again decreased to 1073 when matched to 
information available in 2010, decreasing again to 1061in 2009, and finally resulted to a 
total number of 1029 observations in 2008. The number further decreased when IRS 990 
forms were extracted to include only full IRS 990 tax forms, not EZ forms. This was 
further reduced because not all organizations completed the governance and auditing 
sections on the IRS form 990. Therefore, there is an N = 959 in the final data set.  
Phase Two 
 The second part of the study is twofold; first, it includes the use of exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA). EFA discovers latent variables that exist within a construct. In this 
instance, the construct is the governance section of the IRS 990 tax form. The second 
portion of phase two is an explanation and creation of composite variables from the 
results of the factor analysis.  
Factor analysis theory. Factor analysis allows for understanding as to whether 
there are unobserved or latent variables. Discovering the latent variables is the 
cornerstone of factor analysis theory (Tucker & MacCallum,1997). Factor analysis theory 
focuses on the relationship between observed variables and latent variables; the latent 
variables have systematic influences on the observed variables. The answer to a 
constructed question yields an observed factor, and that factor is influenced by 
underlying latent factors. Relationships between observed and latent factors are linear, 





into common factors and specific factors. Common factors are latent variables that have 
influence over many observed variables. Specific factors are latent variables that are only 
influencing a specific observed variable. The final variable in factor analysis is the error 
term or the error of measurement in each initial observed variable. The errors of 
measurement in factor analysis are additional factors that are not related to any other 
factor. Instead of confirmatory factor analysis, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is 
utilized in this study because I did not want to impose a preconceived structure on the 
measures of nonprofit governance. Specifically, phase two uses principal component 
factor analysis (PCA). This technique is used when the data is highly correlated. It was 
expected and anticipated that the data would be highly correlated throughout this study, 
because all of the data is directly related to governance policies, practices, and procedures 
of 501c3 organizations. PCA allows data to sub-divide into smaller sets or groupings. 
PCA is able to maintain a high level of variance among variables and has been utilized in 
studies of governance concerning the for-profit sector (Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 
2007) and in the nonprofit sector (Yetman & Yetman, 2013). In these studies, PCA 
identified the common variance and unobserved latent variables of governance. In 
addition, promax rotation is conducted with the governance data for my study, which is 
preferred over varimax orthogonal rotation, to account for the highly correlated variables. 
Interpretation of the factor analysis. The second part of phase two includes 
interpretation of the derived results from the PCA. After completion of the factor 
analysis, factors are extracted. The factor analysis results are discussed based on the 
findings from the review of literature and theory, in order to determine if they coincide 





practices. The researcher asks the question: do common variables load together in the 
factor analysis? In an effort to gain an understanding and form an interpretation of the 
PCA results. This last step offers the opportunity to determine if the related measures of 
nonprofit governance have loaded together through the factor analysis. In this study, the 
use of factor analysis creates a representation of nonprofit governance dimensions that 
provide direction in further understanding of nonprofit governance and provides the 
variables utilized in the following phases of data analysis.  
Results were anticipated to be in-line with a preliminary study I conducted 
through my research practicum at James Madison University in the School of Strategic 
Leadership Studies (2014). This included an exploratory factor analysis of a sample of 
508 human service public charities in 2011. The sample did not have gross receipt 
parameters, since studies into agency problems and governance have previously focused 
on larger organizations (specifically ones with gross receipts of greater than $1 million) 
(Yetman & Yetman, 2013). The factor analysis resulted in eight components extracted 
from the 21 nonprofit governance questions identified. Results indicated that information 
gathered on the IRS 990 tax form could lead to a better understanding of an 
organization’s governance policies and practices. 
Factor Analysis 
 Factor analysis for each year was conducted (Appendix E, F, G, H, I) resulting in 
between six and eight extracted components, explaining a cumulative total variance from 
64.71-55.10%. The main three extracted components included the following IRS 990 tax 
form governance questions: Part VI Q8a, Q8b, Q9, Q11, Q12a, Q12b, Q12c, Q13, Q14, 





of the years combined. For further clarification, the 21 reported governance questions 
from Part VI and Part XII for 959 organizations, for year 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 
2012 were combined into one dataset. A factor analysis was completed on the 21 reported 
governance measures.  
 Results (Table 5) showed eight extracted components, derived through a principal 
component analysis extraction method. The components provided a total explained 
variance of 64.441%. The top three components explain 38% of total variance (Table 6).  
The first extracted component included 12 governance factors, Part VI: Q11, 
Q12a, Q12b, Q12c, Q13, Q14, Q15a, Q15b and Part XII: Q1, Q2a, Q2b, Q2c. These 
components explained 24.02% of the variance and had an Eigen value of 5.05. Factors 
are be based on a .4 factor loading or higher (Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; 
Yetman & Yetman, 2012). The first component includes governance questions such as, 
written conflict of interest policy, written whistle blower policy, approval of 
compensations. The auditing questions regarding the organization’s having an auditing 
committee and if financial statements were reviewed by an outside auditor, were also 
included within this extracted component.  
The second extracted component had an Eigen value of 1.71 and explained 8.13% 
of variance. This component included three governance questions, Part VI: Q8a, Q8b, 
and Q9. These governance questions included documentation of governing board 
meetings, documentation of committee meetings, and whether key members of the 
organization are reachable.   
The third extracted component had an Eigen value of 1.44 and explained 6.84% 





Q2a, and Q2b. All of these questions discuss auditing, including having an auditing 
committee and if financial statements were reviewed by an outside auditor. These factors 
were also included in the first extracted component. According to factor analysis theory, 
when factors load onto multiple components, the variables are highly correlated (Tucker 
& MacCallum, 1997). In the case of my factors, it was expected that they would be 
highly correlated, as they were all derived from the same form, regarding governance 
practices in nonprofit organizations and resulting from the need for more transparency 
and accountability post Sarbanes-Oxley. The third extracted component deals with 
auditing questions, however, the IRS 990 tax form Part XII: Q1, Q2a, and Q2b factored 
into two separate components; therefore these questions have been removed from the first 
component and only kept in the third component, thereby only counting them once.  
The results from the factor analysis are used for regression modeling to determine 








Factor analysis component matrix 
Components 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Part VI Q2 .012 .061 .373 .096 -.141 -.644 .246 -.134 
Part VI Q3 .000 .260 .093 .656 .312 .153 .284 -.107 
Part VI Q4 -.134 .123 .162 .208 .031 .141 -.729 -.261 
Part VI Q5 .047 .263 .184 .277 -.187 -.096 .071 .737 
Part VI Q8a .261 .587 .187 -.348 -.332 .131 -.005 -.044 
Part VI Q8b .238 .667 .196 -.247 -.126 .130 .014 -.104 
Part VI Q9 .008 .513 .289 .131 .282 .283 .082 .006 
Part VI Q11 .472 .114 -.062 -.119 -.008 .057 .055 .155 
Part VI Q12a .698 .090 -.220 -.014 .097 -.086 -.072 .109 
Part VI Q12b .657 .318 -.322 .142 .134 -.330 -.095 -.147 
Part VI Q12c .674 .272 -.314 .177 .074 -.327 -.085 -.143 
Part VI Q13 .771 -.084 -.179 -.014 .041 -.003 -.081 .030 
Part VI Q14 .727 -.159 -.188 -.082 -.067 .138 -.019 .096 
Part VI Q15a .747 -.152 -.044 .177 -.258 .254 .058 -.008 
Part VI Q15b .617 -.167 -.066 .257 -.292 .332 .055 .040 
Part VI Q18 .236 -.055 -.136 -.267 .311 .198 .503 -.244 
Part VI Q20 .176 .077 .000 -.313 .604 -.049 -.187 .400 
Part XII Q1 .490 -.265 .415 -.007 .075 -.108 -.015 .066 
Part XII Q2a .551 -.182 .513 .046 .238 .101 -.038 -.118 
Part XII Q2b .614 -.372 .485 -.066 .070 -.047 -.081 -.005 
Part XII Q2c .484 .011 .234 -.140 -.152 -.147 .059 -.158 







  Policy, Documentation, and Auditing Components 
Component Description Governance variables 
1 Policy 
Part VI Questions 11, 12a, 12b, 12c, 13,14, 15a, 
15b 
2 Documentation Part VI Questions 8a, 8b, 9 
3 Auditing Part XII Questions 1, 2a, 2b 
Note: Top three extracted components from the 2008-2012 factor analysis on 21 
governance questions, resulting in 4795 observations.  
 
Composite governance variables. To assess the primary variable of interest, the 
change in reported governance practices, the top three variables, representing over 30% 
of the variance, are used in composite as the dependent governance variables. This results 
in three dependent variables per year (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012). The new 
composite variables are utilized in phase three for trend analysis and t-test. These 
composite variables are used to create the change variables. These change variables 
represent changes in reported governance from time one (T1) = 2008 until time five (T5) 
= 2012. The change variables therefore utilize the following equation: T5- T1= change 
variable. These change variables are used in the regression models. Descriptive statistics 
(Table 7), show the three composite change variables (N= 888). The range of the reported 
governance variables displays the values of reported governance for the sample. The 
policy governance change variable has a range of -8 to 8 (M= .51, SD= 1.45). The 
documentation governance change variable has a range of -3 to 3 (M= .62, SD= .94) and 
the auditing governance change variable has a range of -2 to 2, (M=.24, SD= .56). All of 
the change variables means are small and standard deviations are large for the sample, 







     
 
Descriptive statistics for dependent change governance variables   
Measure M SD 
Range 
Min/ Max Variance 
Skewness 






















.24 .56 -2/2 .32 -.042/.08 
.39/.16 
Notes: N=888  
 
Phase Three 
 The third step in the research design includes a trend analysis, t-test, and 
regression models (Table 8).  
Trend analysis utilizes the new composite variables which are plotted yearly to 
determine if there are changes of reported governance measures over time. Based on this 
study’s foundational theory of coercive institutional isomorphism, it is expected that there 
is an increasing reported use of the governance policies, practices and procedures. This 
also directly tests hypothesis H1a: 
 H1a: Human service nonprofit organizations will report increasing practices of 
governance over time. 
All of the reported governance variables for each organization are summed for 
2008 and then again in 2012. The means of the sum of reported governance measures 





offers the opportunity to compare whether two groups have difference average values. In 
this case, a t-test was chosen in order to determine if there is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean reported governance variables from 2008 compared to 2012. The 
t-test further relates to hypothesis H1a, mathematically measuring time one (2008) to 
time five (2012). 
Multiple regression models are the final step of this study. Regression analysis 
seeks to understand the extent to which nonprofit organizations are changing their 
reported governance practices. Regression analysis offers the opportunity to determine 
directionality and determine changes that have occurred over time with respect to 
multiple variables. Since the data is time series oriented, regression lends itself nicely to 
the creation of a potential model that would explain changes. In this study, I hypothesize 
that there will be increasing reports of governance policies, practices, and procedures, 
and regression will offer the method to discover if this behavior is present. In addition, 
the second part of my hypothesis states:  
 H1b: Human service nonprofit organizations that are larger and older will 
report more consistent governance practices, thereby exhibiting fewer 
changes to their reported governance policies and practices over time.  
The composite variables for the three strongest extracted components from the factor 
analysis are used to create the change variables for the regression models. Independent 
variables, which are derived directly from institutional isomorphism literature, include 
location, age of the organization, and size. For the purpose of my study, size is 
operationalized as the total net assets. Board size is taken into consideration and used as a 





organization are responsible for all legal matters. And, research has shown that the 
optimal board size is 14 members (Board Source, 2003). Location is taken into 
consideration as an independent variable. The age variable represents the year of the 
organization’s formation. Regression models will be run for all three dependent change 
variables as well as a full governance change model using the sum of all reported 
governance practices per year (Table 8 & 9). Regression results are predicted to show 
changes over time in the reported governance measures, thereby supporting hypothesis 
H1a, as well as specifically supporting H1b through results that indicate coercive 
isomorphic changes leading to homogeneity of organizations based on size, age, and 







Phase 3  
Statistical Method 
 
Mathematical Description Description of variables 
Trend Analysis Changes over time 
aggregate governance 
variables 
Line graph of mean 
governance practices per 
year. Computed as sum of 
governance answers on 
the IRS 990 tax form per 
year. 
 Changes over time per 
composite variable 
Line graph of mean 
governance practices per 
year per composite 
variables: Policy, 
Documentation, Auditing 
T-test Comparison over time  Comparison of sum of 
governance practices 
reported on the IRS 990 
tax form in 2008 
compared to 2012 
Regression Models Governance full model  Change DV = T5-T1, for 
the aggregate sum of all 
the variables 
IV = all (size, age, 
location) 
 Composite variables 
model 




IV = all 











Variable Type Description Data Source Source Expected 
sign 








IRS 990 tax 













IRS 990 tax 








Age Year of 
formation: 




IRS 990 tax 





















IRS 990 tax 

























Documentation Part VI Q8a, 
Q8b, Q9 
Guidestar.org; 










Auditing Part XII Q1, 
Q2a, Q2b 
Guidestar.org; 








Note: N= 959  





Overall this study endeavors to understand whether there are changes in reported 
governance policies and practices over time. Furthermore, the study seeks to offer 
practical applications for the use of these tax documents for practitioners, partners, and 
associates of the nonprofit sector. The use of exploratory factor analysis allows for an 
understanding of the relationship between the asked questions. Trend analysis helps 
visually to answer if changes have occurred during the study period. The t-test offers a 
method for understanding the relationship between the means of reported governance at 
the introduction of the governance questions on the IRS 990 tax form in 2008 and five 
years later in 2012. And finally, regression offers the method to determining what 
variables are impacting the changes that have occurred since the implementation of the 








 Results indicate changes in reported governance practices over the five year time 
period. The sequential, multi-phase, quantitative study yielded interesting results that 
lend partial support to both Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Results show a positive trend in 
increasing reported governance practices since the inclusion of the new sections of 
governance and auditing on the IRS 990 tax form and post Sarbanes-Oxley. The 
following results section aims to provide a breakdown of the statistical results, while the 
conclusion section will relate these results to the research question: Is coercive 
isomorphism changing reported governance practices in human service nonprofit 
organizations? 
 The results section starts at phase three of the research design. Statistical methods 
include trend analysis, t-test, and regression models. These are followed by robustness 
testing in order to further find evidence supporting Hypothesis H1b.  
Trend Analysis 
 Trend analysis is used mathematically, as well as visually, to gain a general 
answer to the research objective, which is: Are there changes occurring in reported 
governance practices over the 5 year period of study? As expected, trend analysis 
demonstrates increasing levels of governance between the introduction of the governance 
sections on the IRS 990 tax form in 2008 and 2012. 
Dependent variables. The dependent variables derived from the governance 
questions on the IRS 990 tax form were compiled into composite change variables. These 





all of the 21 governance variables, studied over the five-year period, there has been a 
steady, positive change (Graph 3). Results from the trend analysis also indicated that 
when the composite component variables were computed for changes over time, the 
resulting graph indicates a steady increase of reported governance practices. These areas 
of change over the five year period, are Policy and Documentation, while Auditing has 
seen a slight, one-hundredth of a point decrease in 2012 (Graph 4).
 



















































Note: N= 888 
 
T-test 
 A t-test was conducted to compare the average reported governance practices in 
2008 and in 2012 (Table 10). Results indicated statistical significance, (.000, 2-tailed 
test). This statistical significance indicates whether the difference between the 2008 and 
2012 means is likely to represent an actual difference in the populations. Confidence 
intervals set at 95% resulted in an upper and lower bound of minimal difference. There 
was a significant difference between 2008 governance reporting (M= 13.08, SD= 4.35) 
and 2012 governance reporting (M= 14.30, SD= 4.31), t(887)= 89.67, p=.000. These 
result suggested that there was a difference between 2008 and 2012 reported governance 










































Changes over time in governance practices 
Policy, out of 8
Documentation, out of 3






T-test, comparison of 2008 reported governance practices with 2012 
Measure M   SD t p 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower/ Upper 
Sum of all 
governance 
variables 2008 
13.08 4.35 89.67 .000*** 14.02/14.59 
Sum of all 
governance 
variables 2012 
14.30 4.31 98.90 .000*** 12.80/ 13.37 
Notes: N= 888; ***p< .001 
 
Regression Models 
For the regression models, all organizations that did not demonstrate reported 
change in governance were removed.  When reviewing the data in preparation for the 
regressions, there were several organizations that on average reported no change in 
reported governance practices. In the dataset of 888 organizations, a staggering 432 
organizations had mean overall reported governance change score of zero meaning on 
average these organizations reported no changes in their reported governance policies and 
practices. This says a lot about human service nonprofits organizations. Nearly half of my 
random sample has not changed their reported governance policies and practices post 
Sarbanes-Oxley and additionally over a five-year period. Therefore, I decided to remove 
those organization that had a mean governance change score of zero. This resulted in a 
new sample size of 456 human service nonprofit organizations. Thereby, taking into 
account only those organizations that reported on average some changes in governance, I 
ran four regression models: all reported governance change, reported policy governance 
change, reported documentation governance change, and reported auditing governance 





significantly predicted by the control variable, board size (Beta= .04, p= .00) and the 
coercive isomorphic indicator age of the organization (Beta=.02, p= .07). The overall 
model fit was R
2
=.033, indicating that there are many more indicators that are influencing 
reported governance changes over time. For the second regression model, I looked at 
whether the institutional isomorphic indicators were predicting the reported policy 
governance variables. None of the institutional isomorphic indicators were found to be 
significant. However, the control variable, board size was significant (Beta= .02, p= .00), 
overall model fit R
2
=.029. The third regression model predicted reported documentation 
practices, results again indicated only the control variable to be significant, board size 
(Beta= .01, p= .04). The fourth and final regression model predicted the use of auditing 
practices. These results were in line with the previous models, however the coefficient for 








Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in all governance 
variables 
Measure B Std Err B β T p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.25 .21 -.06 -1.23 .22 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.04 .01 .14 2.99 .00*** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.02 .01 .09 1.82 .07* 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.01 2.09 .01 .01 .99 
5. Location: Midwest .39 2.09 .06 .19 .85 
6. Location: South .22 2.08 .03 .10 .92 
7. Location: West .56 2.09 .08 .27 .79 
Notes: R
2




Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in policy governance 
variables 
Measure B Std Err B β T P 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.18 .13 -.07 -1.34 .18 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.02 .01 .13 2.75 .00*** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.01 .01 .05 1.07 .29 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
-.06 1.36 -.01 -.04 .97 
5. Location: Midwest .21 1.36 .05 .16 .88 
6. Location: South -.21 1.35 -.05 -.16 .88 
7. Location: West .15 1.36 .03 .11 .91 
Notes: R
2








Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in documentation 
governance variables 
Measure B Std Err B β t p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.06 .07 -.04 -.80 .43 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.01 .00 .10 2.11 .04** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.00 .00 .07 1.46 .15 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.58 .71 .24 .81 .42 
5. Location: Midwest .70 .71 .30 .98 .33 
6. Location: South .67 .71 .32 .95 .35 
7. Location: West .75 .71 .32 1.05 .30 
Notes: R
2









Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in auditing governance 
variables 
Measure B Std Err B β t p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.03 .04 -.04 -.72 .48 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
-.00 .00 -.08 -1.68 .10* 
3. Age of 
organization 
.00 .00 .07 1.37 .17 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.32 .43 .22 .75 .45 
5. Location: Midwest .14 .43 .10 .32 .75 
6. Location: South .34 .43 .19 .56 .58 
7. Location: West .29 .43 .21 .69 .49 
Notes: R
2







In order to further support and test for robustness, regression models on the full 
data set, N= 888, were also conducted. Additionally, conducting robustness test on a 
larger sample allows for further testing to the second part of the hypothesis: 
 H1b: Human service nonprofit organizations that are larger and older will 
report more consistent governance practices, thereby exhibiting fewer 
changes to their governance policies and practices over time. 
Four regression models were conducted with an N of 888. One for each of the three 
extracted components and a final model for the change in all of the reported governance 
practices, during the study period (2008-2012). Tables 15-18 present the regression 
results. Reported nonprofit governance practices from 2008-2012 are significantly 
predicted by board size (Beta= .02, p= .01). The overall model fit was R
2
=.016, once 
again indicating that there are many more indicators not being taken into consideration. 
For the second regression model, reporting of policy variables was predicted, and board 
size was significant (Beta= .01, p= .01), overall model fit R
2
=.071. The third regression 
model predicted reported documentation practices for the nonprofit human service 
sample. Results indicated no significance in any coercive isomorphic predictors or the 
control variable. The fourth regression model predicted the use of auditing practices. 
These results indicated that when predicting reported auditing governance practices, total 
net assets is a significant negative predictor (Beta= -.05, p=.04), and overall model fit 
R
2
= .021. These overall results were similar with the first set of regression results.  
This second set of regression models was conducted to offer a fuller model 





changes in their governance practices were removed. The second regression testing 
allows for a comparison and further supports the initial results. Results from the 
robustness test that included a larger population were similar among all four models. 
With this information in mind, it gives more support to the original findings. Moreover, 
brings to light that there is a good possibility that given an even larger population, the 
results would hold constant. Results from the all of the regression models, support 
nonprofit governance literature that states boards are an important and influential part of 
nonprofit organizations. Regression results indicated that board size was a significant 
predictor for the use of more reported governance policies and practices.  
 
Table 15 
Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in all governance 
variables, full dataset 
Measure B 
Std Err 
B β t p 
1. Mean assets 
2008- 2012 (log10) 
-.18 .11 -.06 -1.59 .11 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.02 .01 .09 2.76 .01*** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.01 .01 .06 1.72 .09* 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.19 1.093 .03 .17 .85 
5. Location: 
Midwest 
.39 1.091 .07 .36 .72 
6. Location: South .22 1.087 .04 .21 .84 
7. Location: West .50 1.091 .09 .46 .65 
Notes: R
2









Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in policy governance 
variables, full dataset 
Measure B Std Err B β t p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.12 .07 -.06 -1.78 .08* 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.01 .01 .09 2.76 .01*** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.00 .00 .04 1.01 .31 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.05 .66 .01 .07 .95 
5. Location: 
Midwest 
.19 .66 .06 .29 .78 
6. Location: South -.07 .65 -.02 -.11 .92 
7. Location: West .16 .66 .05 .25 .80 
Notes: R
2
= .017 (N=888); *p < .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01 
 
Table 17 
Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in documentation 
governance variables, full dataset 
Measure B Std Err B β t p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.05 .04 -.04 -1.15 .25 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
.01 .00 .06 1.74 .08* 
3. Age of 
organization 
.00 .00 .05 1.28 .20 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.35 .43 .15 .83 .40 
5. Location: Midwest .41 .42 .19 .97 .33 
6. Location: South .36 .42 .18 .86 .39 
7. Location: West .45 .42 .20 1.06 .29 
Notes: R
2








Regression analysis summary for measures predicting changes in auditing 
governance variables, full dataset 
Measure B Std Err B β t p 
1. Mean assets 2008- 
2012 (log10) 
-.05 .03 -.07 -2.03 .04** 
2. Mean number of 
board members 
2008- 2012 
-.00 .00 -.06 -1.87 .06** 
3. Age of 
organization 
.00 .00 .03 .96 .34 
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.3 .25 .23 1.28 .20 
5. Location: 
Midwest 
.16 .25 .12 .65 .52 
6. Location: South .24 .25 .20 .94 .35 
7. Location: West .30 .25 .22 1.17 .24 
Notes: R
2
= .021 (N=888); *p < .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01 
 
Categorization of reported governance. Further robustness tests were 
conducted on the group of human service nonprofit organization who reported no 
changes in their reported governance policies and practices over the five year period. 
There were 432 organizations who reported no changes in their governance policies and 
practices (Table 19) between 2008 and 2014. This sample was broken down into two 
groups, based on their reported governance practices from the 21 variables listed on the 
IRS 990 tax form. Groups exhibiting high reported governance (reported governance of 
greater than 10) and those who reported low governance (less than or equal to 10) were 
formed. Interestingly, out of the organizations that reported no changes in their 
governance practices, 344 out of 432 were categorized into the high governance group 
(Table 20) and 123 into the low reported governance category (Table 21). This means 
that 344 organizations reported 11 or more governance policies and practices over the 





were already potentially practicing multiple forms of governance prior to the introduction 
of the governance section on the IRS 990 tax form in 2008. This could also provide 
support against coercive institutional isomorphism occurring in human service nonprofit 
organizations, because they were already practicing many of the newly reported 
governance policies. In other words, 344 human service nonprofit organizations did not 
change their reported governance practices as a result of the new questions on the IRS 
990 tax form.  
Table 19 
     
Descriptive statistics for organizations that reported no change in governance 
policies and practices  










Age 26.05 15.25 3/78 .98/.12 .61/.23 
Total net assets 
(log10) 
5.87 .69 4.49/7.08 -.14/.12 -.66/.23 




     
 
Descriptive statistics for organizations that reported no change in governance 
practices, high category  









Age 26.15 15.13 4/78 1.05/.14 .88/.28 
Total net assets 
(log10) 










     
Descriptive statistics for organizations that reported no change in governance 
practices, low category 









Age 25.79 15.61 3/66 .82/.22 .33/.43 
Total net assets 
(log10) 
5.71 .78 4.50/7.08 .02/.22 -.99/.43 
Notes: N=123 
 
T-tests. T-tests were conducted in order to statically understand if there was a 
significant difference between the high and low governance groups, based on the 
coercive isomorphic indicators age and total net assets (Table 22 & 23). Results indicated 
statistical significance, (.000, 2-tailed test) for both age of the organization and total net 
assets of the organization. This statistical significance indicates there is a difference 
between the high and low reported governance groups based on the isomorphic indicators 
of age and size (total net assets). Confidence intervals set at 95% resulted in an upper and 
lower bound of minimal difference. There was a significant difference between the mean 
age of the high and low reported governance groups, t(308)= 30.38, p=.000. Significant 
results were also indicated between the mean total net assets of the high and low reported 
governance groups, t(308), p=.000. These result support hypothesis H1b; larger and older 








T-test, comparison of high/ low reported governance groups mean age 
Measure M   SD t p 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower/ Upper 
Mean age of high 
governance group 26.15 15.13 30.38 .000*** 24.46/ 27.85 
Mean age of low 
governance group 
25.79 15.61 18.33 .000*** 23.00/ 28.57 






T-test, comparison of high/low reported governance groups mean total net assets 
Measure M   SD t p 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower/ Upper 
Mean total net assets 
(log10) of high 
governance group 
5.94 .64 163.37 .000*** 5.87/ 6.01 
Mean total net assets 
(log10) of low 
governance group 
5.71 .78 81.53 .000*** 5.57/ 5.85 










 The statistical analysis of the reported governance practices from the IRS 990 tax 
form indicate that there have been increases in reported governance policies and practices 
in human service nonprofit organizations since the introduction of the new governance 
sections in 2008. The factor analysis offered the avenue to codifying the variables from 
the IRS 990 governance sections. The extracted components supported the literature and 
theory review based on nonprofit governance. The trend analysis visually showed the 
changes of reported governance policies and practices over time. The results provided 
support to hypothesis H1a: Human service nonprofit organizations will report increasing 
practices of governance over time. In order to follow up in these results, a t-test was 
conducted. Results indicated that there was a significant difference in 2008 and 2012 
reported governance practices. The t-test results offered further support for H1a. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are increasing practices of reported governance 
in nonprofit human service organizations since the 2008 change in the IRS 990 tax form, 
which was initially prompted by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 Regression results were conducted to determine if specific coercive isomorphic 
indicators directly related to changes in reported governance practices. Results revealed 
the control variable board size, and the coercive isomorphic indicators of age and total 
net assets as significant predictors. The age of an organization and the mean total net 
assets had minimal support revealed through the robustness regression models. However, 
the control variable, board size, was the only significant predictor across both the initial 





Findings within this dissertation study indicate further support to the previous 
research that board size influences organizational decision making. As seen through the 
regression models, the size of the board significantly relates to changes in reported 
governance practices in the human service nonprofit subsector. Per federal guidelines, all 
nonprofit organizations are required to have boards of directors. Whether this was put 
into place as an oversight mechanism or in an advisory role, this study as well as previous 
studies provide support that all nonprofits need to have boards and that these boards 
significantly impact the organizational environment. Mean board size for this study was 
12.37 with a standard deviation of .35, signifying that there is little spread of the number 
of board members across the sample size of 888. This study is in alignment with the 
previously research on the optimal board size of 14 members (Ostrower, 2006). The 
optimal board size of 14 members was derived from studies that researched 
communication, team dynamics, and the ability to come to consensus on issues. 
Additional studies related to board size indicate that it has a curvilinear relationship with 
governance, specifically focusing on decision-making, communication, team 
development, and task-orientation. In this dissertation, I used board size as a control 
variable because of the importance of boards in nonprofit organizations. Further, this 
study did not discuss or research effectiveness, capacity, or efficiency; therefore, 
conclusions cannot be drawn to the relationship between boards and reported use of 
governance mechanisms. And it is not the intent of this dissertation to give results that 
imply larger boards are better boards or that larger boards lead to better governance. Nor 
does more governance equal better governance. Therefore, it is imperative for readers of 





depicted through a parabola. And there could be a point of diminishing returns related to 
board size and decision making. Overall, it is evident that the board is an influential 
component to the leadership of nonprofit organizations. The board makes oversight 
decisions and guides the organization based on their mission and vision, but more board 
members does not yield better leadership, just as more governance does not mean better 
governance.  
Through the continued testing of hypothesis H1b: Human service nonprofit 
organizations that are larger and older will report more consistent governance practices, 
thereby exhibiting fewer changes to their governance policies and practices over time. 
Robustness test, in the form of t-tests, were completed. Results indicated a statistically 
significant difference between the means of age and total net assets of organizations 
reporting no changes in their governance practices in two different t-tests, between 
groups of high and low governance. Results supported coercive institutional isomorphic 
theory that organizations who are more mature and are larger (based on total net assets) 
are less likely to change practices over time. Results could be understood as organizations 
that are older and larger are more stable and secure in their environment, therefore 
environmental changes are not having as much of an effect on them as newer and smaller 
nonprofit organizations. This directly ties to organizational theory, specifically 
environmental ecology, through the liability of newness and liability of smallness, stating 
that smaller organizations have a lower capacity, they are unable to make as many 
changes or provide as many responses because of environmental triggers (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977:1984; Singh & Lumsden, 1990). Furthermore, there could be an argument 





capacity, compared to smaller organizations; therefore, these organizations have policies 
and procedures in place to gather needed information and make an informed supported 
decisions. Liability of smallness and liability of newness theories purport that smaller 
organizations have lower capacity ability and have a tendency to make quick uninformed 
decisions that need to be amended or overturned (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004). 
Furthermore, smaller and newer organizations potentially do not have the maturity or 
organizational ability to recognize or pick up on coercive signals as quickly and in as 
much of a timely manner as their larger and older counterparts.  
Limitations 
 There was not an already constructed and verified database with IRS 990 tax form 
data for Part VI and XII, prior to this study. This made it difficult and increased the error 
term. Not only did I hand code each and every Part VI and Part XII for 1000 
organizations over a five year period, but I also input those individually into an excel data 
sheet. Therefore, one of the major limitations to this study and points of concern is the 
potential researcher error. Further limitations exist in that data itself. Since this is self-
reported data, there could be a case for box checking and/or misunderstanding of the 
questions. Previous research and publications alluded to the notion that nonprofit 
organizations were not completing the IRS 990 tax form’s new section because of lack of 
proper education and information regarding those new sections (Guidestar, 2009; 
Independent Sector, 2010). Organizations might feel compelled to respond affirmatively 






 Another limitation concerns the variable construction. When constructing the 
change variables, I had to take ordinal variables, those coded zero and one and aggregate 
them to create the change variables. This was the only way to run a linear regression. 
When aggregating the variables, there is a loss of information. You cannot decipher each 
variable component for itself; meaning that when you combine or aggregate multiple 
variables into a composite variable you are unable to parse out further information from 
within that new composite variable. Therefore, the model was not able to detect specific 
changes based on individual questions related to the IRS 990 tax form. In addition, when 
aggregating the numbers, and computing time five (T5)- time one (T1), there is another 
potential loss of information. An organization could end up showing no changes when 
they actually increased or decreased their reported governance, however this was 
accounted for in the follow-up analysis. 
Generalizability 
 A randomized sample of 501c3, human service operating charities in the United 
States of America, derived from the NCCS core dataset, which is a nationally recognized 
database, was utilized in this study; therefore, this study is generalizable to the nonprofit 
human service sector. As of 2012, there were over 60,000 organizations classified under 
the NTEE major code ‘HU’ or human service. The study’s sample size included nearly 
2% of the reported population. Human service nonprofit organizations include criminal 
and legal entities, youth development organizations, and relief centers. The NTEE code 
of human service was specifically targeted because of the range of goods and services 
included under this code. Results from this study focus on leadership as seen through the 





easily transferable to another nonprofit sub-sector. Furthermore, even though this study 
utilized an organizational level of analysis, the individual nonprofit executive director 
and the nonprofit board president can relate to the overall message of the results: coercive 
isomorphic forces have the ability to change reporting behavior. Whether or not they 
actually change root governance behaviors is still open to questions. Furthermore, the 
IRS 990 tax form can be used to understand an organization and the questions presented 
in the governance section can be used to learn more about an organization. These results 
are informative to the general public, in understanding that there are increasing reported 
use of governance policies and practices thereby potentially increasing the transparency 
and accountability of the nonprofit sector.     
Conclusion 
The results from this study have implications for leadership in the nonprofit sector 
as understood through reported governance practices. Not only was information utilized 
that was publically available, it was utilized in a manner that has not been done before. 
Results are in alignment with coercive institutional isomorphism theory and nonprofit 
governance literature. It was found that the coercive isomorphic indicators of age and 
total net assets are significant in predicting changes in nonprofit governance reported 
practices. Additionally, the control variable of board size was found to have a significant 
impact on reported nonprofit governance policies and practices according to the IRS 990 
tax form. As discussed in the literature review, coercive institutional isomorphism theory 
was originally founded, researched, and tested on the for-profit sector. Though over time 
studies have applied institutionalism to the nonprofit sector (Cornforth & Brown, 2014; 





the results yielded through my quantitative dissertation, the research designed supported 
and guided through coercive institutional isomorphism is a positive contribution to the 
nonprofit scholarly community.  
Results suggest that there are changes occurring in reported governance practices 
in the nonprofit sector, but the test models clearly present evidence that there are 
variables not being accounted for. What are these variables? Are they unique to the 
human service sector of operating charities in the United States or are there other 
influences impacting the nonprofit sector in general? This dissertation clearly uncovered 
that there were changes, suggesting the use of more governance policies and practices in 
nonprofit human service organizations post Sarbanes-Oxley. However, the exact cause or 
effect has yet to be determined.  
These results indicate that there is evidence of an increased usage of reported 
governance policies, practices, and procedures since the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the implementation of the new IRS 990 tax form questions. This is understood through 
the IRS 990 tax form’s governance questions. Results from this study have the ability to 
assist nonprofit leadership, specifically nonprofit boards and nonprofit practitioners. 
There are over 1.4 million 501c3 social benefit organizations operating in America. It is 
the increasing task and challenge of researchers to become familiar with and to utilize all 
available data to assist nonprofit practitioners. This dissertation offers an understanding 
of the new governance questions on the IRS 990 tax form related to changes in reported 
practices in human service nonprofit organizations. As seen in this study, through the 
completion of a factors analysis, results indicated that the IRS 990 tax form Part VI and 





and procedures, documentation of meetings, and the use of auditing committees. These 
further relate to essential components of organizational leadership: policies, 
documentation, communication, and board meeting practices.  
The results from this study are available to assist the seasoned practitioner, the 
new nonprofit director, government agencies, and other regulatory bodies. This provides 
an understanding and evidence that nonprofit organizations are not in limbo, but rather 
are continually changing and passion driven organizations. This shows that they are 
affected, in one or another, by their organizational environment. However, this also 
means that organizations need to be aware of their external environments. Organizational 
change theory presents the foundation for understanding that the organizational 
environment is influential to organizational decisions. Through adaption to the 
environment, selection of the specific type of environment you want to reside in, or 
embeddedness into the environment, it is essential that organizations learn to work with 
and for their surroundings. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the organizational leaders 
to understand what types of coercive measures they may want to consider, recognize, and 
potentially avoid. These could include understanding the economic and socioeconomic 
region the organization operates in or being connected to the public sphere and paying 
attention to new rules and regulations at the state level. Through the results of this study 
that supported Hypothesis H1b, coercive isomorphic indicators of age and total net assets 
are significant indicators of change. Organizations need to be aware of their mission, 
vision, values, and understand their organizational maturity. When focusing on potential 





understand their decision making processes, in order to not make knee jerk reactions to 
their environmental changes.  
Furthermore, it has been the objective of this research, to utilize data, via 
statistical representation, and represent how it applies to the practitioner. Hypothesis H1a, 
was supported and organizations were found to positively report usage of more 
governance policies, practices, and procedures over time. Support was found for 
hypothesis, H1b: Human service nonprofit organizations that are larger and older 
reported more consistent governance practices, thereby exhibiting fewer changes to their 
governance policies and practices over time. Age and total net assets were found to be 
significantly different, through the robustness t-test, when the organizations were 
classified into high and low reported governance categories. This lends support that 
larger and older organization are more stable. 
However, when the initial regression models were conducted, age and total net 
assets were not found to be significant indicators. This could lend support to the 
advancement and development of smaller and newer nonprofit organizations. Perhaps 
these new and therefore less experienced nonprofit organizations are starting on a better 
more knowledgeable level or more secure footing or understanding than their 
predecessors. This could be due to many factors, most of which need to be asked through 
interviews and a qualitative study. However, the most prominent factor may be that the 
new nonprofit organizations are being formed with more informed and knowledgeable 
leaders. This dissertation does not delve into individual leadership or motivation to lead, 
but it could be that nonprofit leaders are coming to nonprofits with more experience than 





more seasoned professionals. This would be a great future research line, seeking to 
understand the different education and experience levels of executive directors and staff 
members, compared to isomorphic institutional indicators.   
Nonprofit organizations, as researched throughout this study, were found to have 
elements of conformity. However, this was only evident when measuring the reported 
practices of governance on an aggregate scale. Based on the literature and the theoretical 
framework, conformity leads to a higher level of public perceived legitimacy. Though 
results confirmed my hypotheses, research results are not generalizable to the entire 
nonprofit sector, since I only studied human service nonprofit organizations. However, it 
would be useful for this study to be replicated in other nonprofit sub-sectors. 
Furthermore, there needs to be replicate studies that are able to offer a continuation of 
this line of inquiry to further track and report changes over time.  
Implications 
 Leadership in the American nonprofit sector has many influences and results from 
this research are twofold, both aimed to allow for practitioner understanding as well as a 
strong contribution to the scholarly community. The need for results to be available, 
comprehensible, and interpretable for the nonprofit leader is crucial. Not only do research 
results yield a better and more widespread understanding of the nonprofit field, but also 
research supported practices aid the nonprofit director in securing grants, increasing 
acceptability, and substantiating and maintaining best practices. The research design, 
literature reviewed, foundational theory support, and the discussion offer a strong base 
for comprehensive understanding. Additionally, my endeavor to gather data from IRS 





basis for continued coding of this data. If complete data from the IRS 990 tax forms was 
coded and made available through databases such as The Urban Institute’s NCCS system, 
scholarly researchers would then have access and the ability to confer multiple theories 
and best practices. Furthermore, availability of any data from the nonprofit sector helps to 
increase know-how and to support nonprofit leaders.  
 Specifically, results that indicated support for board size as an indicator are 
crucial to the overall nonprofit sector. Choosing the right board, the most knowledgeable 
boards, and the board that fits with the organizational mission is imperative for nonprofit 
practitioners. Through this study, result indicated the significance of boards as an 
influential contributor to reported governance change over five years. Previous studies 
have expanded on the overall significance of boards and board members (Gill, Flynn, & 
Reissing, 2005; Ostrower & Stone, 2006; Cornforth, 2011). Implications from this study 
related to boards and there overall impact as an indicator of change add a contribution to 
the nonprofit scholarly research field as well as assist the practitioner in understanding 
the importance of boards.  
Future Research 
 My dissertation lays the groundwork for multiple future studies, as well as my 
own research agenda. I plan to continue to research nonprofit organizations throughout 
my academic tenure. As an organizational leadership scholar, I have situated my research 
interest completely within the nonprofit sector. The foundation that my dissertation 
establishes is an incredible help and asset to my research career. A few lines of inquiry 
that I hope to carry out over the next few years include a qualitative examination of the 





directors and their board presidents, attempting to follow-up on the IRS 990 tax form 
reported governance policies, practices, and procedures. Additionally, it would be a 
unique and stand-alone mixed methods endeavor to survey nonprofit organizations that 
report having an audit committee and discuss the use of an independent auditor verses an 
in-house audit. Other lines of inquiry include broadening the scope of this research 
design, to include more of the nonprofit sector in order to offer more cross sectional 
insights and generalizability. Other researchers might take up the challenge to find 
relationships between objective economic measures and reported policies and practices, 
such that there might be connections between grant awards, government support, or even 
compensations and reported governance practices. Other lines of inquiry could delve into 
a philanthropic lens, offering an understanding if agencies who report more or consistent 
use of governance mechanisms received larger or more stable funding streams.   
  My main research agenda, post dissertation, is to advocate and promote the use 
and inclusion of publically available data to nonprofit researchers and practitioners. I 
intend to continue collecting 501c3 IRS 990 tax form data and adding to my database. 
However, I believe that data such as this should be available, at no cost, to the masses. 
This is especially true, if this data will help strengthen the nonprofit field, as shown to be 
the case in the conclusion of my dissertation.   
Conclusion Summary 
This study focused on nonprofit leadership as seen through the reported 
governance in social benefit organizations in the United States. Results in this study are 
helpful to nonprofit organizations. As depicted in the trend analysis the changes included 





carried out by human service nonprofit organizations. Key findings of this dissertation 
study reflect support of the hypotheses, that nonprofit organizations are exhibiting 
increased reported governance practices since governance questions were added to the 
IRS 990 form in 2008. Older and larger human service nonprofit organization report 
more consistent use of governance practices, indicating coercive isomorphism, imposed 
by the new forms, are influencing reporting behavior. With continued availability of data 
sources and constructed databases, the arena of nonprofit sector research will hopefully 









                                                 
i
 The creation and establishment of an over-arching Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), under the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), was a product of the Act. The PCAOB’s 
purpose is to oversee the activities of the auditing profession. 
ii
 Historically, resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), agency theory, and institutional 
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) are used to understand nonprofit governance. Recent literature notes the 
need to combine theories and apply a more multi-disciplinary view to the overall nonprofit sector, and 
particularly nonprofit governance (Cornforth, 2004; Ostrower & Stone, 2010). To address the shortcomings 
in research, scholars offer combined theory approaches, with perspectives from various disciplines. As 
noted previously, resource dependency theory and institutional theory were among the most frequently 
used single-dimensional theoretical approaches. Guo and Acar (2005) combined those two theories with 
network theory to understand formal and informal collaborations. Results indicated that multiple 
environmental factors influence forms of collaboration. In 2011, Jegers and Wellens also combined 
resource dependency theory with institutional theory, while incorporating the literature on participatory 
governance practices. Jegers and Wellens’ study focused on offering guidelines pertaining to beneficiaries 
of nonprofit organizations, specifically discussing how benefactors should be involved regarding 
governance and policy. There have been attempts to utilize a combined methodology. Cornforth and Brown 
attempted to raise issues related to the varied co-modeling of multiple theories to fill informational gaps to 



























FREQUENCIES VARIABLES Meanassets2008_2012log10 /format = notable / 
PERCENTILES = 5 95. 
 
COMPUTE winsor_assets = Meanassets2008_2012log10. 
if  Meanassets2008_2012log10 <=4.49355 windsor_assets= 4.49355. 







Appendix D: Correlation of independent variables, entire dataset  
         Means, standard deviations, and correlations of independent  variables, entire 
dataset 
Correlations 











11.87 13.230 .123**      
3. Age of 
organization 
29.92 92.096 .004 -.002     
4. Location: 
Northeast 
.21 .410 .064* -.040 -.017    
5. Location: 
Midwest 


































Appendix E: Factor Analysis 2008 
Factor analysis, extracted component matrix, 2008 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Factors        
Part VI Q2 .003 -.027 .304 .294 .547 -.348 -.163 
Part VI Q3 .004 .200 .030 .690 .012 .357 .050 
Part VI Q4 -.112 .157 .128 .279 -.316 .305 -.320 
Part VI Q5 .074 .350 .170 .143 .050 -.201 .679 
Part VI Q8a .258 .593 .287 -.293 -.162 -.149 -.110 
Part VI Q8b .247 .633 .275 -.214 -.096 -.099 -.196 
Part VI Q9 .012 .520 .336 .055 -.120 .280 .076 
Part VI Q11 .482 .135 -.050 -.130 .062 .041 .110 
Part VI Q12a .750 .145 -.241 .046 .178 .039 .041 
Part VI Q12b .708 .297 -.284 .188 .240 -.026 -.157 
Part VI Q12c .708 .267 -.274 .218 .200 -.086 -.146 
Part VI Q13 .765 -.102 -.154 -.043 .029 .022 -.006 
Part VI Q14 .721 -.142 -.182 -.149 -.111 -.012 .087 
Part VI Q15a .727 -.125 -.062 .107 -.395 -.138 .078 
Part VI Q15b .602 -.118 -.105 .160 -.486 -.112 .143 
Part VI Q18 ,237 -.059 -.189 -.269 .078 .413 -.261 
Part VI Q20 .214 .142 -.022 -.325 .324 .473 .323 
Part XII Q1 .483 -.283 .383 -.010 .118 .071 .147 
Part XII Q2a .534 -.304 .476 .101 .010 .254 -.061 
Part XII Q2b .588 -.393 .486 -.031 .040 .071 .025 






Appendix F: Factor Analysis 2009 
Factor analysis, extracted components matrix, 2009 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Factors       
Part VI Q2 -.004 .046 .378 .090 .333 -.530 
Part VI Q3 .016 .305 .103 .576 .206 .305 
Part VI Q4 -.140 .156 .165 .140 .084 .484 
Part VI Q5 .050 .269 .215 .418 -.120 -.303 
Part VI Q8a .230 .541 .277 -.298 -.383 -.125 
Part VI Q8b .203 .629 .257 -.235 -.213 -.034 
Part VI Q9 -.040 .436 .342 .027 .026 .364 
Part VI Q11 .467 .152 -.016 -.145 -.074 -.032 
Part VI Q12a .718 .179 -.217 -.007 .131 -.036 
Part VI Q12b .691 .348 -.292 .078 .318 -.074 
Part VI Q12c .587 .290 .290 .111 .291 -.119 
Part VI Q13 .770 -.065 -.178 .019 .014 .024 
Part VI Q14 .726 -.133 -.189 -.053 -.173 .018 
Part VI Q15a .724 -.134 -.054 .217 -.316 .057 
Part VI Q15b .612 -.130 -.079 .304 .387 .124 
Part VI Q18 .234 -.019 -.139 -.370 -.042 .292 
Part VI Q20 .192 .069 .001 -.356 .486 .183 
Part XII Q1 .487 -.288 .382 .031 .082 -.012 
Part XII Q2a .553 -.243 .485 -.019 .131 .229 
Part XII Q2b .615 -.365 .460 -.047 .072 .013 






Appendix G: Factor Analysis 2010 
Factor analysis, extracted components matrix, 2010 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Factors       
Part VI Q2 .009 .112 .420 .070 -.223 -.503 
Part VI Q3 -.003 .370 .108 .557 .217 .208 
Part VI Q4 -.148 .160 .156 .133 .238 .312 
Part VI Q5 .000 .263 .254 .492 -.258 -.213 
Part VI Q8a .184 .563 .179 -.386 -.378 .160 
Part VI Q8b .198 .656 .161 -.292 -.128 .091 
Part VI Q9 -.073 .374 .252 .041 .422 .291 
Part VI Q11 .468 .119 -.059 -.119 -.074 .013 
Part VI Q12a .713 .128 -.237 .045 .033 -.099 
Part VI Q12b .672 .322 -.329 .123 .164 -.248 
Part VI Q12c .689 .261 -.312 .151 .120 -.255 
Part VI Q13 .773 -.045 -.176 .002 .024 .027 
Part VI Q14 .724 -.147 -.170 -.058 -.123 -.125 
Part VI Q15a .745 -.158 -.015 .177 -.207 .268 
Part VI Q15b .608 -.172 .021 .279 -.247 .349 
Part VI Q18 ,250 -.019 -.158 -.357 .163 .201 
Part VI Q20 .178 .043 -.036 -.167 .539 -.319 
Part XII Q1 .493 -.228 .424 .052 .082 .099 
Part XII Q2a .568 -.122 .484 -.070 .275 .123 
Part XII Q2b .630 -.274 .474 -.093 .120 -.043 






Appendix H: Factor Analysis 2011 
Factor analysis, extracted component matrix, 2011 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Factors         
Part VI Q2 .012 -.050 .267 .462 .403 .212 .428 -.080 
Part VI Q3 -.020 .267 .307 -.440 .312 .317 -.205 -.044 
Part VI Q4 -.154 -.093 .090 .302 .120 -.290 -.438 .414 
Part VI Q5 .055 -.052 .230 .011 .238 .202 .417 .632 
Part VI Q8a .293 .515 .017 .530 -.310 .128 -.044 .009 
Part VI Q8b .241 .690 .227 .210 -.253 -.016 -.088 -.051 
Part VI Q9 -.003 .462 .495 -.421 .044 .006 .086 .123 
Part VI Q11 .474 .076 -.036 .025 -.148 .229 .115 .271 
Part VI Q12a .678 -.023 -.078 -.081 -.168 -.041 .131 .190 
Part VI Q12b .574 .372 -.323 -.050 .436 -.293 .090 -.074 
Part VI Q12c .683 .325 -.341 -.039 .456 -.241 .040 -.066 
Part VI Q13 .781 -.035 -.139 -.092 -.059 -.081 .026 .090 
Part VI Q14 .738 -.129 -.172 -.085 -.187 .046 .000 .090 
Part VI Q15a .766 -.738 -.087 -.054 .001 .276 -.237 .031 
Part VI Q15b .638 -.217 -.113 -.085 .017 .334 -.284 .110 
Part VI Q18 .237 -.007 .013 -.279 -.237 .182 .399 -.361 
Part VI Q20 .139 .047 .168 -.243 -.342 -.523 .297 .224 
Part XII Q1 .506 -.301 .338 .129 .074 -.200 .062 -.189 
Part XII Q2a .558 -.104 .560 -.027 .056 -.141 -.171 -.138 
Part XII Q2b .628 -.339 .384 .153 .031 -.186 -.046 -.160 





Appendix I: Factor Analysis 2012 
Factor analysis, extracted component matrix, 2012 
Components 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Factors         
Part VI Q2 .018 .003 .272 -.387 .423 .110 -.448 .147 
Part VI Q3 -.023 .321 .235 .532 .334 -.216 -.060 -.173 
Part VI Q4 -.156 -.052 .088 -.318 .073 .117 .518 -.423 
Part VI Q5 .000 -.030 .238 -.113 .180 -.218 .296 .763 
Part VI Q8a .314 .547 .189 -.430 -.343 -.100 -.097 -.098 
Part VI Q8b .239 .666 .350 -.134 -.229 -.035 .053 -.035 
Part VI Q9 -.002 .382 .451 .506 .092 -.009 .186 .053 
Part VI Q11 .463 .145 .040 .007 -.192 -.051 -.073 .099 
Part VI Q12a .639 .037 -.165 .032 -.175 .135 .076 .054 
Part VI Q12b .585 .365 -.340 -.007 .405 .291 .064 .017 
Part VI Q12c .618 .320 -.348 -.009 .422 .191 .071 .006 
Part VI Q13 .776 .029 -.172 .063 -.022 .067 .092 .039 
Part VI Q14 .739 -.108 -.190 .059 -.159 -.064 .061 .029 
Part VI Q15a .760 -.157 -.050 .031 -.011 -.407 .051 -.066 
Part VI Q15b .629 -.198 -.060 .061 -.024 -.506 .091 -.039 
Part VI Q18 .228 -.043 -.056 .333 -.194 .135 -.564 -.019 
Part VI Q20 .123 -.054 .082 .224 -.398 .513 .170 .317 
Part XII Q1 .487 -.354 .353 -.122 .121 -.177 .002 .037 
Part XII Q2a .553 -.169 .536 .136 .062 .159 .045 -.217 
Part XII Q2b .623 .376 .378 -.102 .041 .185 -.019 -.118 
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